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The widespread usage of mobile devices has lead to mobile devices being used
to replace existing solutions, including smart cards for authentication in ac-
cess control systems. While this can be convenient, there are security concerns
which must be addressed. One such concern for access control authentica-
tion is relay attacks, which are more difficult to prevent when using Bluetooth
on a mobile device rather than smart cards. This thesis investigates an al-
ternative method of detecting relay attacks, using sensors present on typical
mobile devices to fingerprint a location. As opposed to other research, this
approach uses only the sensors available on a single mobile device, in order to
be compatible with existing access control systems that do not have specialised
sensors. The proof of concept shows several sensor types are strong indicators
of location, particularly observable WiFi signals.
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1 Introduction
The usage of mobile devices has increased significantly over the past decade.
With most people now possessing and carrying a mobile device everywhere
with them, mobile devices are being used for many purposes, including inter-
acting with existing technology, supplementing or replacing existing interac-
tion mechanisms. These changes come with many benefits, but also create or
exacerbate security concerns.
Relay attacks are a class of attack in which the attacker forwards communic-
ation between two legitimate endpoints, without their knowledge that messages
are being forwarded [3, 9]. The attacker does not compromise the communic-
ation’s confidentiality by reading or integrity by modifying the messages as in
a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack, but instead merely compromises the
endpoints’ assumptions about their respective location. This broken assump-
tion compromises the integrity of authentication systems relying on proximity
of devices, enabling the attacker to pose as someone with legitimate access
to a system by forwarding authentication requests to a device with legitimate
access, and forwarding the response back to the access control system.
As mobile devices are being used for proximity-based authentication, relay
attacks against mobile devices are becoming a serious concern. There are a
number of mechanisms used for handling relay attacks in traditional access
control systems, but mobile devices pose new challenges and limitations for
dealing with such attacks. Typically relay attacks are detected using a timing-
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based distance bounding protocol [13], which times the latency of messages
to determine the distance between the communicating devices. Limitations in
the hardware and software stacks of mobile devices make timing-based distance
bounding unreliable, therefore a new mechanism is required for detecting relay
attacks on mobile devices, while working within the hardware constraints of a
typical mobile device.
1.1 Objectives
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility of using the sensors and
radio signals available to a typical consumer smartphone device for the purpose
of detecting relay attacks. This research will investigate using the sensor inputs
available on a typical mobile device to detect relay attacks, by using machine
learning to fingerprint the location of the access attempt.
Timing-based distance bounding can be unreliable at detecting relay at-
tacks due to limitations of the software and hardware stacks on consumer
smartphone devices. These limitations make it possible for attackers to re-
liably defeat timing-based distance bounding. The objective of this research
is to determine whether a sensor and radio signal based approach can detect
relay attacks with a comparable accuracy to that of timing-based distance
bounding. Such techniques need not replace timing-based distance bounding;
by combining multiple alternative methods of detecting relay attacks, higher
accuracy and reliability may be achieved while limiting the attacker’s ability
to defeat the system.
Consumer smartphone devices commonly contain multiple wireless radios
and a range of environmental sensors. Available radios typically include WiFi,
Bluetooth, Cell, and GPS. Available sensors commonly include environmental
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information such as magnetic fields, acceleration, and orientation. The full list
of sensors available on the test device is enumerated in listing A.1.
1.1.1 Scope
The concept is generic enough to be applied to any common mobile device
(Android, iOS, Windows Phone). However it is not feasible to target all of
them for a proof-of-concept, so only Android will be specifically covered by
this research. The scope of this research is limited to testing the feasibility
of using sensors and radio signals on an Android device for fingerprinting the
locations of static (non-moving) access control points.
1.1.2 Hypothesis
By using the sensors and radio signals available on a common Android smart-
phone to fingerprint the location of access control authentication attempts
and comparing with the fingerprints for known valid prior access, relay attacks
can be detected with accuracy comparable to that of traditional timing-based
distance bounding.
1.2 Requirements
There are some key requirements which must be met in order to produce
a viable system for detecting relay attacks, given the hardware constraints
of the target system and the timing constraints of real-time access control
authentication.
1. the machine learning model must be trained on the device rather than
distributing a pre-trained model, as the data is specific to each access
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controlled location
2. models cannot even be shared between user devices for the same location,
as the data for the models is recorded by the user devices, which have
different sets of sensors with differing calibrations
3. models must perform well on a wide range of low-power mobile devices
4. there is only one class (successful access), as unsuccessful access covers
everything else, and is unlikely to occur often enough to train even if it
were possible to train for
5. the model needs to be updated with new instances over time as the
environment can change
1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 will discuss background information relevant to this research. This
covers relevant wireless protocols, relay attacks and mitigation techniques, and
data analysis techniques.
Chapter 3 will discuss the different sensors available on a typical Android
device, their value for detecting relay attacks, and the design of our classifier
for detecting relay attacks.
Chapter 4 will evaluate the classifier’s effectiveness at detecting relay attacks
using different sets of sensors.
Chapter 5 will give recommendations on implementation of sensor-based relay
attack detection.
Chapter 6 will conclude the research, and give suggestions for future work.
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2 Background
2.1 Wireless Access Control
Historically, access control systems have used Radio-Frequency Identification
(RFID) smart cards as an authentication mechanism [22, 31]. However, with
the recent ubiquity of smartphones, these systems have sought to develop com-
parable authentication mechanisms using smartphones in place of smart cards.
Near Field Communication (NFC) was a logical choice for such a mechanism,
being based on RFID standards and compatible with existing RFID technology.
However, NFC was not available for use by apps on iOS until the recent release
of iOS 11 [6]. This led multiple security systems companies to instead develop
authentication functionality using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [21, 31].
2.1.1 Smart Cards
Contactless smart cards are the technology traditionally used for authentica-
tion by access control systems [21, 31]. There are a number of standards used
in access control. Older Wiegand smart cards operating on the 125 kHz fre-
quency band behave as a simple value store, which typically allows encoding
and retrieving 26-bits of data [30]. This causes serious problems for secure
usage, as an attacker could listen to the communications and learn the “secret”
value, or simply brute-force the id (typically 16 bits). These have been su-
perseded by the newer 13.56 MHz smart cards, which have an internal chip
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capable of cryptographically generating a single-use code which can be veri-
fied without revealing the data stored on the card [1]. These devices typically
have a read range of less than 10 cm and a low, predictable packet latency
(except when running cryptographic operations), which is useful for detecting
and preventing attempted relay attacks.
2.1.2 NFC
NFC is a set of wireless communication protocols that enables low-bandwidth
communication between electronic devices (typically a smartphone) over a dis-
tance of less than 4 cm [2]. Contactless RFID smart cards and NFC devices
both operate in the 13.56 MHz band, and are inter-compatible between reader
devices [2]. This enables a smartphone to fill the role of a smart card, however
restrictions by certain smartphone platforms have limited the uptake of smart-
phones replacing smart cards. iOS did not allow apps to use NFC until recently
with iOS 11 (2017) [6]. iOS still does not allow listening for NFC tags in the
background, which has been supported by Android since API 9 (2010) [5].
2.1.3 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a wireless communications technology that supports wireless com-
munications over distances between 1 and 100 metres, depending on the mode
and class of the devices being used [12]. Bluetooth has evolved through several
iterations with different features and properties. Of these, BLE is most relev-
ant to this project’s domain, as it is being used for authentication in access
control systems, in place of traditional short-range authentication mechanisms
such as contactless smart cards [21, 31]. Bluetooth behaves significantly dif-
ferently from the contactless smart cards and NFC, which enables some useful
new functionality (such as authenticating from a great enough distance that a
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truck driver would not need to leave their vehicle), but also introduces some
new problems.
2.1.3.1 BLE
BLE is a wireless communications technology based on Bluetooth, that was
designed as a low-power solution for control and monitoring applications. Low
power consumption is achieved by maximising the proportion of time that the
Bluetooth hardware is in a low-power sleep state, at the expense of latency
and data throughput [23, 41]. BLE on smartphones (especially Android) has
unpredictable latency, which makes it easier for an attacker to perform a re-
lay attack compared to alternative technologies such as smart cards. The
connection interval when the device actually transmits can vary from 7.5 ms
to 4 seconds, and is negotiated between the two devices [12]. The possible
range of values varies between different devices, and may not be possible to
determine from application code on the device. A sent or received packet may
spend a significant length of time in the system Bluetooth stack before being
actually sent or passed to the application code. These factors differ between
hardware, different software versions or configurations, and between different
battery levels or “power saving” modes on the same device. The diversity of
the Android platform makes this a much more significant problem than on
other platforms such as iOS which have a comparatively small set of devices
to consider.
2.2 Relay Attacks
A relay attack consists of an attacker forwarding a communication between two
legitimate endpoints, without their knowledge. This is distinct from a MITM
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attack [14, 25] as the attacker does not read or modify the communication
(and in fast may not be capable of doing so), but instead gains an advantage
by merely forwarding the communication. This advantage typically consists of
breaking the endpoints’ assumptions about who they are communicating with.
A traditional description of a relay attack is the Chess Grandmaster Prob-
lem: a story in which a little girl wins a game of chess against a grandmas-
ter [17]. In the story, the girl plays two simultaneous games against two grand-
masters via mail, one as black and one as white. Once her white opponent
makes a move, she copies that move to her game against the black opponent,
then copies their response to her game against the white opponent, and so
on. In this way, she is guaranteed to either win one game or draw two games
against chess grandmasters, without needing any skill at the game.
In the scenario of an access control system, a relay attack can be used
to gain access by talking to both the access control system (verifier) and the
user’s mobile device (prover). By forwarding an authentication request from
the access control system to a user’s device which has legitimate access to that
system, and forwarding the authentication response from the device back to the
access control system, the attacker can gain entry. The access control system
grants access because it assumes a device with legitimate access is present,
however that device may be a long distance away and being forwarded by the
attacker.
There are two common types of relay attack against authentication systems:
mafia fraud; and terrorist fraud [9]. In a mafia fraud, there are two cooperating
attackers taking the place of the little girl in the chess grandmaster problem,
one talking to the prover and one talking to the verifier, and forwarding mes-
sages between each other. In a terrorist fraud, the prover collaborates with
an attacker to fool the verifier into granting access to the attacker. This re-
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search is only concerned with the “mafia fraud” attack, as the mitigation will
be performed in the prover (application on a mobile device), which is already
compromised in the “terrorist fraud” attack.
2.2.1 Detection / Prevention
Wireless authentication systems commonly rely on distance as a form of secur-
ity: the wireless connection requires the prover to be in close proximity to the
verifier, which means the authorised party must be physically present. Relay
attacks break this assumption by arbitrarily extending the distance between
the prover and verifier by placing an attacker between them. Therefore an
attempt is made to prevent this attack by some type of “distance bounding”:
proving the distance between prover and verifier is within an acceptable range.
2.2.1.1 Signal Strength
Rudimentary distance bounding can be achieved by measuring the strength of
the received signal [7, 15]. If the transmit power is known, the distance can be
calculated based on the difference between the received signal strength, and the
strength of the transmitted signal. This has some serious problems that make it
impractical to use in reality however. Interference from other signals, physical
barriers, and relative movement of the devices can all affect the received signal
strength, which will reduce the accuracy of the distance calculation [7]. An
attacker can relay and re-transmit the signal from a closer location, resulting in
a high received signal strength and short perceived distance. An attacker can
also transmit with a higher than expected power or focus the transmission on
the receiver with a directional antenna, resulting in the received signal strength
being higher than expected even over a large distance.
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2.2.1.2 Timing based
Typically “distance bounding” refers to timing-based distance bounding. The
idea behind this is that a relay attack will take some amount of additional
time to receive, relay, and re-transmit the data. If this additional delay is
detectable, then the relay attack can be detected.
Timing based distance bounding works by sending a series of packets and
timing the round trip time to establish a lower-bound on the distance between
the devices. There are a large number of approaches for achieving this with
varying levels of reliability and efficiency in different network environments.
Inevitably they rely on predictable packet processing delay in order to min-
imise unknown timing and calculate an accurate distance. A naive approach
sends “ping” requests which are immediately responded to by the receiver. This
approach can produce very high resolution distance bounding as no digital pro-
cessing is required before responding, so the response delay can be as low as
a few nanoseconds [38, 13]. In practise such a protocol could be trivially in-
tercepted by an attacker near the sender, who responds immediately and fools
the sender into measuring the distance between the attacker and the sender,
rather than the longer distance between the sender and intended receiver. In
order to prevent this preemptive response attack, timing packets need to con-
tain some information that the attacker cannot predict, so only the intended
receiver can produce a valid response which is verified by the sender. Some
approaches to preventing this attempt to perform some cryptographic opera-
tion such as signing a value at the receiver before responding [7]. This is not
ideal, as it takes a significant amount of time compared with the actual latency,
which complicates timing, but may still produce an accurate result as long as
the cryptographic operation takes a predictable time. Other approaches use a
shared secret, and perform distance bounding by sending single bits from that
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secret value [13, 33, 36]. The verifier sends random challenge bits, and the
prover responds with the result of a function of the challenge bit and the next
sequential bit from the secret value—for instance, XOR(challenge, secret).
This simplifies the necessary data processing so the response delay can be very
small, on the order of 100 ns [13]. Assuming the attacker doesn’t know the
shared secret, they have a (1
2
)n of guessing the correct response sequence in
order to respond faster than expected and break the distance bounding calcu-
lation. There are multiple extensions to this distance bounding protocol. [27]
achieves much faster operation over a high-bandwidth lossy channel, at the
cost of the attacker gaining higher chance of guessing the correct response at
(3
4
)n, meaning more challenge-response cycles must be completed to achieve
the same accuracy. [36] extends [27], introducing an third “empty” challenge
bit value, to which there must be no response. This complicates processing,
but improves the accuracy back to (1
2
)n.
In a wireless communications medium such as Bluetooth where signals
propagate at approximately the speed of light, proving co-presence within a
100 metre radius requires packets to be processed and replied to in less than
a microsecond (because it takes less than a microsecond for light to travel 100
metres). The most efficient distance bounding protocols use analog processing
to process and reply to a packet within a nanosecond, two orders of magnitude
faster than the most efficient digital implementation [38].
Some distance bounding protocols use a slower-than-light medium such as
ultrasound to perform distance bounding [15, 26]. Distance can be measured
more precisely in a slower-than-light medium, as it takes longer for the signal
to propagate the same distance. Sound for instance is six orders of magnitude
slower than light [15], which enables even cheap simple hardware to accurately
measure distances based on signal latency. By comparison, where measuring a
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100 metre distance requires sub-microsecond processing at light-speed, it can
be measured with ultrasound with timing accuracy on the order of 100 milli-
seconds, because sound only travels at approximately 340ms−1 in air. However
this comes with a serious flaw which can be exploited by an attacker: as the
communications medium is slower than light, an attacker can relay the com-
munications over an out-of-band communications link which propagates faster
than the intended channel (e.g. a radio or wired electrical link), thereby deliv-
ering the data to the recipient earlier than expected and beating the distance
bounding algorithm.
The Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) stack introduces a significant amount of
fixed delay in communications, which increases the minimum round-trip-time
to several milliseconds (six orders of magnitude slower than an analog RF
implementation). Due to the band jumping nature of the BLE protocol, an
attacker cannot significantly reduce this delay. In fact, a naive relay attack re-
quires two Bluetooth connections rather than one, which introduces additional
delay which can be trivially measured. Using this method, Gallagher’s [21] in-
ternal testing achieved high relay-attack detection rates (90–100% depending
on the device for a basic proof-of-concept relay attack). However, this method
of relay attack detection has some flaws which can be exploited by an attacker
to achieve a relay attack with much higher rate of success:
• There is variable delay in the Bluetooth stack caused by packet pro-
cessing and retransmission, which cannot be controlled or observed by
an application running on a mobile phone. This means the detection
accuracy will vary between devices, and resulting in lower accuracy or
even false-positives on some devices.
• A sophisticated attacker could record and relay the raw RF signals used
for Bluetooth communication, either by recording all of the RF chan-
12
nels (79 for Bluetooth Classic; 40 for BLE [12]), re-transmitting them at
the other side of the relay, or by detecting the active channels or inter-
cepting the data used for picking the channel hopping sequence. This
would result in a single Bluetooth connection transparently bridged over
an arbitrary distance (so long as the distance is small enough for the
transmit windows to still line up). There does exist some research into
using channel hopping as an anti-relay attack system, based on the as-
sumption that an attacker cannot relay all channels of a channel hopping
communication system in parallel [3]. This assumption does not appear
to hold against a sufficiently equipped attacker: at best channel hopping
provides a linear increase to the complexity of a relay attack. Even if
an attacker cannot detect the active channel and is forced to relay all of
the channels, they can relay each channel individually by simply adding
more hardware to handle each channel as required.
One possible attack against this kind of timing is to overclock the network-
ing hardware to send at a slightly higher frequency [15]. Typically, commu-
nications systems include a clock in the transmission to which the receiver
synchronises, to avoid the sender and receiver getting out of sync due to clock
drift. If the attacker slightly increases the rate of the signal’s clock while re-
maining within the tolerance of the receiver’s equipment, the communication
will proceed at a higher speed, resulting in the packet being received slightly
faster than expected. This clearly cannot decrease the time taken for a bit of
information to actually travel from the sender to the receiver, but may decrease
the time spent in a send queue, resulting in a full packet being completely re-
ceived faster than it otherwise would be.
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2.2.1.3 Environment based
Another method of detecting relay attacks is to test for co-presence in the
same environment based on sensor readings the devices can gather about the
environment [40, 43, 24]. When two devices want to prove they are present
at the same location (not communicating over a relay attack), they use built-
in sensors to read information about their environment, and compare that
information to determine whether they are in the same location. Devices
that are co-located should read similar values on all of their sensors, whereas
they are unlikely to do so when in completely different locations during a
relay attack. This requires the two devices both have matching sets of sensors
which are calibrated to read values similar enough to detect co-presence, and
precisely enough to detect when the devices are not co-present. The sensors
also need to provide accurate readings within a reasonable time-frame in order
to provide a smooth user experience. A common upper limit for the sensor
window is 500 ms [24]. Not all of the sensors commonly available on Android
devices return a usable value within this 500 ms window.
[24] enumerated the sensors on an Android device, and evaluated them
based on time required to produce a usable value. The sensors that could









These sensors were evaluated individually, and were barely better than ran-
dom guessing (the best sensor having a 38.9% equal error rate, i.e. a best
case of 38.9% false positives and 38.9% false negatives). The low accuracy of
these sensors is unsurprising, as they measure more about the exact position
and orientation of the device than any proximity to another nearby device.
They suggested for future work to combine multiple sensors to provide a more
accurate combine reading.
[40] evaluated a number of sensors provided by a third-party peripheral
device “sensordrone”. This device had a different set of sensors to those com-
monly available in an Android device:
• Temperature
• Humidity
• Precision Gas (Carbon Monoxide level)
• Atmospheric Pressure
Individually these sensors provided 70–80% accuracy by comparing readings
between two sensordrone devices. When combining multiple sensors, accuracy
was improved to 90–95%. The sensors were also able to instantaneously return
a reading when polled, however this is because they were always on and con-
stantly monitoring. Any mobile device could achieve the same by constantly
monitoring its sensors, at the cost of battery life. This is impractical as a
mobile solution, because both devices require an external sensor device with
its own power source.
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[43] evaluated a different set of sensors on an Android device, and evaluated
them individually as well as when combined:
• Audio (Microphone)
• WiFi (RSSI of nearby devices)
• Bluetooth (RSSI of nearby devices)
• GPS Raw Data
The GPS data is unlikely to be practical within a reasonable timeframe, as
it is normally turned off to save battery and takes too long to turn on and
detect the necessary satellites. For this reason the paper [24] excluded GPS
from their testing. This paper used a window ranging from 5–15 seconds for
recording data, which is why GPS can be used here. WiFi and Bluetooth were
also excluded by [24], likely because devices do not typically send announce-
ments more frequently than 500 ms in order to get a new RSSI value within
that timeframe. However this does not matter as much as for GPS, because
WiFi is typically always on, and Bluetooth will always be on when running
an app that is authenticating over Bluetooth. As WiFi and Bluetooth will be
turned on, they will have received the most recent RSSI readings, which will
be reasonably accurate (unless the device is moving extremely fast, in which
case a relay attack may be falsely detected and the user would need to stop
and try again). It was found that WiFi was the best predictor, and combining
multiple predictors created improved resilience against attacks while retaining
a low false-positive rate.
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2.2.2 Attacks
There are a number of relevant examples of relay attacks against wireless
authentication systems, including research into defeating existing distance
bounding protocols, and research specific to attacks against Bluetooth.
Smart locks are a recent Internet of Things (IoT) development that provide
an access control solution targeted at individual consumers. Among a myriad
of other critical vulnerabilities commonly found in IoT devices, they have also
been found to be vulnerable to relay attacks against their Bluetooth commu-
nications [39, 32]. Bluetooth in particular has been shown to be especially vul-
nerable to relay attacks [34], in part due to its high and unpredictable latency
reducing the effectiveness of latency-based distance-bounding [15]. Some pos-
sible mitigations such as geo-fencing are discussed in [32]. Geo-fencing requires
a recorded location for the access control reader, which may not be practical to
add to existing systems which can have hundreds of existing readers without
a location record. It also requires an accurate location reading on the user’s
mobile device, which will be inaccurate without either leaving the GPS on
(draining battery) or waiting for a signal after turning it on (taking too long
for a smooth user experience).
Smart card and NFC technology has also been shown to be similarly vul-
nerable to relay attacks. Attacks have been demonstrated against card-based
financial transactions [18], Mifare access control cards [26], and mobile NFC
financial transactions [19]. In all of these instances distance bounding is sug-
gested as a mitigation to protect against relay attacks, however it is noted
that distance bounding is not always practical or reliable due to the tight
timing constraints. This is less of an issue for RFID technologies than with
Bluetooth, however remains an issue with low-cost passive RFID tokens due
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to their resource and cost constraints [26]. Some additional mechanisms for
preventing and detecting relay attacks are discussed in [19]. These include
detection mechanisms such as checking location and cell tower signals, which
will be further investigated in this research; and modifying the communica-
tions protocol to make attacks more difficult (which is out of scope, as this
research focuses on consumer smartphone devices using Bluetooth).
2.3 Data Analysis
In order to detect relay attacks using smartphone sensors, the data gathered
from the smartphone’s sensors will be analysed using a machine learning al-
gorithm. Due to the requirements described in section 1.2, this classification
problem requires a classifier capable of streaming and single-class classification.
2.3.1 Single-class Classification
Single-class classification is a relatively uncommon type of classification, in
which the algorithm tries to distinguish instances of a specific class from all
other instances, by training on only instances of the single class [35]. This
differs from the typical multi-class classification problem, in which training
data is available for all the classes, and the algorithm finds differences which
separate each class. Single-class classification may be used when there is only
training data available for a single class, or when there are an infinite (or very
large) number of other “classes”. The algorithm has to use the information it
has about the one class it knows, to determine whether an instance looks like
it fits with the training data, or appears to be different.
Fingerprinting locations using sensor data is a single-class classification
problem. There are nearly infinite possible locations, so the classifier cannot
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possibly be trained on each of them. Instead a single-class classifier must be
used, and trained on the single location for which there is data. When the
device is present in the expected location, the classifier will determine the
instance is in the same class as the training set, and when it is in another
location the classifier will determine the instance is an outlier.
A common technique for building a multi-class classifier uses a density
function [35, 42, 44]. The probability density of the target class is calculated
from the training data, and a region enclosing the target class is computed,
with a threshold at a chosen cutoff probability density. When classifying a new
instance, instances outside of this threshold will be classified as unknown (not
of the target class). The threshold value affects the false-positive and false-
negative rate, and must be chosen as such depending on the nature of the data
and the application. In effect, this threshold can be represented as a region in
N-dimensional space, where each dimension is an attribute normalised by the
probability density function for that attribute.
Single-class classification can also be built on top of a multi-class classifier
by generating artificial data to produce a second class which the multi-class
classifier can use [28]. This enables using any multi-class classifier that can
produce class probability estimates, and can be combined with the traditional
density function to yield improved performance over using the density function
or multi-class classification model alone.
2.3.2 Streaming Classification
A streaming machine learning classifier always has a usable model, and con-
tinually updates the model whenever it receives a new training instance [8].
This differs from traditional batch machine learning, which has access to all
of its training instances when training, and can only be used for classification
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once training is completed. In order to handle an arbitrary amount of samples
gathered (streamed) over time, a streaming classifier has different requirements
from a traditional batch classifier [11]:
1. Process one example at a time, and inspect it only once (at most)
2. Use a limited amount of memory
3. Work in a limited amount of time
4. Be ready to predict at any time
This streaming behaviour is useful when working under resource constraints
such that the entire training set cannot be analysed at once, or when dealing
with a continual source of new training data, where it is impractical to retain
all previous training instances to recompute the model entirely. Both of these
situations apply to this project—the most important requirements are 1 &
4 as new instances are received at a very slow rate, but the classification is
time-sensitive, and the entire set of instances may become large enough to
encounter resource constraints.
2.3.3 Weka
Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) is a collection of ma-
chine learning algorithms, data pre-processing tools, and analysis tools which
supports easily exploring datasets and evaluating machine learning approaches [20].
WEKA contains a large set of common machine learning algorithms well
suited to classifying data into different classes, such as the J48 decision tree
algorithm and the Naive Bayes classification algorithm [37, 10, 16]. These
can achieve high accuracy on many datasets, but lack features required for
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this domain. Namely, a suitable classification algorithm must be capable of
single-class classification; and incremental updating / streaming learning.
There are approaches for enabling streaming learning in many machine
learning algorithms [8, 11], some of which implemented in WEKA, and more
supported in Massive Online Analysis (MOA), WEKA’s streaming-focused
machine learning counterpart [11]. There are also approaches for single-class
classification, with one such algorithm implemented in WEKA [29]. However,
none of the classifiers supported by WEKA support both streaming and single-
class classification.
Therefore a custom classifier will have to be produced to meet the require-
ments of this project. WEKA’s analysis tools will be used for parsing input
data, and for testing and validating the custom classifier.
2.3.4 Predictors
There are a range of potential predictors available on a smart phone device
which can be used for detecting relay attacks. For the purposes of this research
only the sensors and wireless signals available to a typical Android smartphone
are considered, however other possible predictors have been enumerated for
reference.
2.3.4.1 Timing
Timing-based distance bounding works by calculating an estimate of the dis-
tance between two devices, based on the latency in communications between
the devices. This relies on the communications medium between the devices
having a predictable latency which can be used to determine the distance
between the devices. In the case of distance bounding with a light-speed
communications medium, it can be functionally impossible to achieve a relay
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attack as any added distance between the devices will add latency in accord
with the speed of the communications medium. In sub light-speed commu-
nications media, it is possible for an attacker to forward communications over
a faster medium, tricking the distance bounding and allowing communication
over a greater distance. In the case of Bluetooth, this problem is even worse:
Bluetooth communications are technically transmitted over a light-speed me-
dium (radio frequency), however a number of optimisations for power usage
and reliability result in high latency which can be variable and unpredictable.
As shown in Figure 2.1, existing timing-based distance bounding implement-
ations for Bluetooth (such as those used by devices providing authentication
over Bluetooth) rely on the doubling of software stack latency caused by wait-
ing for the transmit window of an additional Bluetooth connection, rather
than the inherent latency of the communications medium. This itself is unre-
liable due to the unpredictable latency of introduced by the Bluetooth stack
on different devices and software versions. This can also be defeated entirely
by an attacker capable of recording and re-transmitting all of the Bluetooth
wireless channels (79 for Bluetooth Classic; 40 for BLE [12]), in effect bridging
a single Bluetooth connection over another link. As shown in Figure 2.2, this
can significantly reduce the latency introduced by the relay attack, making
packet timing an unreliable predictor of relay attacks.
2.3.4.2 Historical Access
In a typical access control situation, a user’s access will be predictable to
some extent by two main factors: time; and path. Both of these predictors
would optimally be implemented on the access control server which has all of
the necessary historical data for each user. This requires integration with a
specific access control server, which is out of scope for this project.
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Figure 2.1: Relay attack on Bluetooth authentication using two connections
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If the user follows a schedule for accessing zones (such as arriving at their office
at the same time every day), that schedule can be learned and used to detect
and mark anomalous access attempts as a probable attack.
Path Based
Areas in an access control system can be represented as nodes in a directed
graph. When authenticating for access to an area, the system checks that
the user’s most recent known location is in an area that contains the door
being used, and is connected to the new area. An access attempt from an
invalid source location would be marked as a possible relay attack. This system
requires support from the access control system in order to track users through
zones. A lesser offline approach could be achieved by recording on the mobile
device which access points have been entered, and building a model of how
the user normally gets into a zone. Either of these approaches could of course
be defeated by an attacker, but they are an additional barrier and potentially
require the attacker to make multiple access attempts, raising the chance of
detection.
2.3.4.3 Wireless Signals
By recording detected wireless signals during previous instances of successful
access, a model can be built for what signals are expected in a future access.
There are four common wireless signals available on mobile phones: Bluetooth;
WiFi; Cell; and GPS. Using wireless signal strengths for distance bounding is a
similar concept to the basic signal strength based distance bounding discussed
in Section ??. However this approach differs by using all available signals to
recognise a location, thereby placing less reliance on the signal strength of a
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single signal, and also considering the presence of other signals in the area.
As such it is more complicated to attack, but still suffers the same general
weaknesses with signal reliability and ability to spoof signals.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth is likely to have a high number of signals and a short range which
can be helpful for building a precise model, however there are a number of sig-
nificant problems here: Due to the short range and common usage of Bluetooth
for personal devices, it is likely that a significant proportion of detected devices
will frequently move or disappear entirely, making them useless and potentially
detrimental to the model. As Bluetooth is also the protocol being protected
for access control purposes, a number of the measured signals will belong to ac-
cess control devices which must exist in order for access control to work (which
makes the use of such signals in the model redundant). Any attacker is also
already going to be spoofing Bluetooth addresses, and could spoof additional
addresses with relatively low effort.
WiFi
WiFi covers a larger area than Bluetooth and typically has a more consistent
signal strength and doesn’t move around. WiFi access points in particular
typically stay in a fixed location until they are (infrequently) added, removed,
or replaced. It is likely the strongest WiFi signals in the vicinity of the access
control point are controlled by the operator of the access control system, how-
ever WiFi access points can still change or appear/disappear without notice,
or be temporarily created by mobile devices sharing their cellular connection.




Cell towers cover a much larger area than Bluetooth or WiFi, to the point they
are likely not to be useful for distance bounding over short distances. With
signals from multiple cell towers it may be possible to triangulate a location,
however signal strength readings from unused cell towers may not be frequently
updated or directly exposed by cellphone operating systems, which prevents
this from working reliably. As with all wireless signals, cell towers can also
change addresses or appear/disappear unexpectedly, and can be spoofed by an
attacker with the right equipment.
GPS
GPS is unlikely to be useful, as the GPS radio typically won’t be powered on,
and the time it takes to power on and retrieve usable data is too long for an ac-
cess control authentication scenario [24]. Due to this limitation, reading GPS
coordinates would most likely fallback to computing a location based on cell
towers and nearby WiFi access points—which are already being used directly,
or use a cached location—which can be extremely inaccurate. As the absolute
location is unimportant (only the distance relative to the access control device
matters), this computed location estimate doesn’t provide any additional use-
ful data, and instead would be redundant and potentially unreliable.
2.3.4.4 Other Sensors
Android devices have a number of other sensors such as orientation, magnetic
field, light, and proximity sensors. None of these appear to have any strong
correlation with location or proximity to an access control reader, but they
should be considered for completeness. Listing A.1 shows the complete list
of sensors available on the Android device used for testing. Many of these
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sensors have high correlation, being different measures of the same property, or
different processed forms of the same measurement. This would result in low
efficiency when needlessly combining multiple sensors with high correlation,
and may negatively impact prediction accuracy depending on the classification
algorithm.
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
There are a range of acceleration/rotation sensors available on Android devices.
These sensors are closely related and are used to calculate a range of software
sensors.
• Accelerometer—provides the acceleration force applied to the device
• Gyroscope—provides the rate of change of rotation of the device, which
is used along with the accelerometer and magnetometer to determine the
rotation vector of the device.
• Gravity and Linear Acceleration—calculated based on the accelerometer
and the rotation vector (the acceleration applied by gravity, and the
acceleration excluding gravity, respectively).
About half of the sensors available on a typical Android device are actually
based on some combination of the accelerometer and gyroscope. This makes
some of them redundant as predictors for classification, however others may
be improved by their software pre-processing which removes potentially con-
founding information (e.g. linear acceleration is the accelerometer with gravity
removed).
These sensors are not expected to be useful for distance bounding, as the
phone will most likely be in a person’s hand or pocket, rendering its orientation
and acceleration unreliable. The best possible scenario would be if the phone
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was placed on a flat surface, then it could perhaps detect any slope of the floor
or swaying of the building.
Magnetism
Magnetism is the most promising of the sensors available on a typical Android
device. It detects not only magnetic north, but also local magnetic fields which
may be caused by electronics and machinery. This is unlikely to be a strong
indicator in general, but may be useful in some extreme situations. One issue is
that the sensor is directional, but the orientation of the phone is not consistent.
This could be dealt with by taking multiple measurements and filtering out
the magnetic north component of the reading, or by processing the magnetic
field to only consider the strength rather than the relative orientation of the
field. Reducing the reading to a magnitude scalar would greatly reduce the
information available for prediction. Instead of detecting a magnetic field in
a specific direction, only the presence of an abnormal magnetic field would be
detected, which is far less unique and therefore less useful as a predictor for
classification.
Light, Proximity
The light and proximity sensors are completely useless as predictors for dis-
tance bounding. The light sensor is often used to implement a proximity sensor
in software by detecting reduced light, and is not designed for measuring am-
bient light which could potentially useful information about the environment.
They provide information about whether the phone is in a pocket/bag/closed




This project focuses on protecting Bluetooth-based Mobile phone authentica-
tion systems from relay attacks. Timing-based distance bounding is not reli-
able on Bluetooth, and therefore is insufficient for securing an authentication
system that communicates over Bluetooth. To solve this problem, timing-
based distance bounding can combined with a number of other relay attack
indicators to form a statistical model that provides more accurate detection
of relay attacks. To use these other relay attack indicators, a custom machine
learning classifier will be created. This classifier fingerprints locations based on
sensor data, and predicts whether a given reading is at the expected location
(not an attack), or elsewhere (a relay attack).
For the purposes of testing, the classifier is split into two applications: an
Android app gathers sensor data, and a WEKA classifier performs the actual
classification from input datasets. WEKA is the University of Waikato’s ma-
chine learning suite, that includes a collection of tools for processing data,
running machine learning algorithms, testing the performance of classifiers.
Implementing the classifier for WEKA is convenient, as it enables tweaking
and analysis of the classifier’s predictions using pre-existing tools built into
the suite. As WEKA is implemented in Java, the classifier can also be directly
used in an Android app without any changes to the implementation. WEKA
also provides meta classifiers which can be used to combine multiple classifiers
into a single classifier that uses the predictions of all of its combined classifiers
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to provide a more accurate prediction. This feature could be used to com-
bine classifiers for multiple relay attack predictors, including a timing-based
distance bounding approach.
3.1 Classifier
WEKA contains a large set of machine learning algorithms, none of which
meet all of the requirements for this problem listed in section 1.2. Some of
the algorithms could theoretically be modified to support more of the require-
ments, however the necessary modifications would require extensive changes
and still not be ideal. For instance: only a small subset of WEKA’s avail-
able algorithms support updating a model with new instances (requirement
5). These algorithms don’t support classifying instances for a single class (re-
quirement 4). On the other hand there are single-class classifier algorithms,
which support classifying instances as either in a single class, or unknown.
The intersection of streaming and single-class classifier algorithms is smaller
again, and is not implemented in WEKA. Some could potentially be modified
to handle both, for instance using a wrapper algorithm that wraps a multi-class
classifier to produce a single-class classifier, or modifying an algorithm to sup-
port single-class classification. For example, K-nearest-neighbours algorithm
can support incremental updating as well as handling single-class classification
by checking the distance to the neighbours (as all the neighbours will be in the
same class, so distance is necessary to determine whether an instance is in or
out of the class). This approach becomes very complex, and raises performance
problems due to high storage usage for the model itself, and high processing
power demands for classifying new instances (requirement 3). A common way
for dealing with high requirements for processing power on mobile devices is
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to offload the processing to a server that pre-processes the data, so the mo-
bile device can perform minimal processing on its end. Requirements 1 & 2
prevent this from being practical, as each (mobile-device, access-control-point)
pair needs its own model.
To meet these requirements while also being usable in WEKA for perform-
ance analysis, a simple custom machine learning algorithm has been imple-
mented. This algorithm builds a cluster from the known good instances. The
algorithm takes a set of instances, each containing readings for a number of
different wireless signals. The data is processed by considering each unique
wireless signal or sensor as a dimension, where each instance is represented by
a position in N-dimensional space, N being the number of attributes. A cluster
of instances is formed based on the trends in the attribute (sensor / signal)
values. Instances are then classified by calculating the distance between the
instance’s position, and the centre of the cluster of known good instances.
Some bias can be produced by the magnitude of different attributes, shown
in Figure 3.1a. Attributes with a greater range in values will affect the distance
calculation more than an attribute with a smaller range. This is particularly
common between different types of sensors representing different physical prop-
erties with different scales. Another cause can be a sensor/signal with a lot
of noise. This sensor should be ignored due to being unreliable, but will in-
stead have a high weight due to its large range in readings. To prevent this,
attributes are normalised and stored as a standard deviation and mean, as
shown in Figure 3.1b. This makes attributes contribute more evenly to the
distance calculation, and means unreliable sensors with a large range will have
a high standard deviation and therefore a low normalised distance. Conversely,
sensors with a tight group of values will have a low standard deviation, so any
abnormal values will contribute more significantly.
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All calculations used in the algorithm are chosen to ensure they can be
efficiently and accurately updated with minimal data, so updating the model
with new training instances can be done quickly and without needing to store or
re-process previous training instances. In order to allow updating the classifier,
the only additional data to store is the number of instances containing each
attribute. This means that each attribute is represented by its mean, standard
deviation, and count. When storing each value as a double, this requires only
24 bytes per attribute, making the model very manageable on any hardware.
If an access attempt (instance) is successful, it used to further train the model,
incrementally updating the model over time as it is used. The count is trivially
updated: count += 1. The mean is also trivially updated using the count as
shown in Figure 3.2. The standard deviation can also be updated by using
the variance, which is the square of the standard deviation, the mean and the
count, and the equation in Figure 3.3. As the model has only been implemented
for evaluation in WEKA and not in a live environment, incremental updating
is not implemented beyond proving that it is supported.
The major remaining problem with this model is that it requires data which
can only be generated by successful usage in the live environment. The first
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Figure 3.2: Updating mean with a new value
mean =
x + mean× oldcount
count
Figure 3.3: Updating variance with a new value
s2N =
(N − 2)s2N−1 + (xN − x̄N)(xN − x̄N−1)
N − 1
few usages will have no protection against any form of relay attack. This can
be handled by requiring interactive authentication during initial training of the
model, or combining with another distance bounding technique which works
without training such as timing, or accepting reduced accuracy (and security)
during the first few access attempts.
3.2 Data Collection
Data is collected using a mobile application (shown in Figure 3.4) that outputs
values to a log file over a short period (less than one second) representing the
data that could be recorded in the short period of time available during an ac-
cess control authentication event. Bluetooth, WiFi, and Cell Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI) readings are recorded using ad hoc classes which spe-
cially handle their respective wireless signal, as these signals must be accessed
using specific API classes. All other sensors are handled in a generic manner
by enumerating all available Sensor implementations using the SensorManager
API. These sensors produce an arbitrary number of values, unlike the single
RSSI value being considered for wireless signals. All values are stored in the log
file in a CSV format which can be processed later. After data collection, the
log files for a specific location are processed into a WEKA Attribute-Relation
File Format (ARFF) data file. Sensors are translated directly to attributes
33
Figure 3.4: Data Collection Application
in the dataset. For sensors that output a single value (such as wireless signal
RSSI values), that sensor is translated to a single attribute. For sensors that
output multiple values—such as the accelerometer which outputs a vector of
acceleration in X, Y, Z directions—each scalar value is translated to a single
attribute, resulting in multiple attributes for that sensor. Each log file is con-
verted to a single instance, with values for every attribute (sensor reading)
which was recorded in the log file. Log files do not contain information about
the location they were recorded in, instead logs from different locations are
stored in different folders, so the processing script translates the parent folder
of each log to the class for that instance. Missing values are left empty in
the dataset, to be handled separately handled in the classifier. Some log files
may contain multiple values for the same attribute, for sensors which report
a continuous stream of data, and produce new readings frequently enough to
output more than once in a single recording period. If multiple values exist
for the same attribute, they are combined to a single value by recording their
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Figure 3.5: RSSI Trend Graph
mean.
For radio signals, the app also supports some simple visualisation of the
RSSI values for a particular signal, in the form of a graph (shown in Figure 3.5)
that displays the RSSI over time and shows some calculations about the trend
of the data. The calculations provided in the visualisation demonstrate how
signal-strength based distance bounding can work, and show how unreliable it
is, especially with a low-power signal such as Bluetooth.
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4 Analysis
The classifier supports some configuration settings which can be changed to
modify the behaviour of the classifier, resulting in different prediction perform-
ance.
The threshold setting controls the final decision for whether an instance
is considered valid or not. This threshold value is the number of standard
deviations from the mean distance to accept for instances in the cluster. A
threshold of 1 would mean to accept values with a distance of at most one
standard deviation from the mean distance for samples in the cluster. Chan-
ging the threshold value affects the ratio of false-positive to false-negative. A
low threshold value minimises the false-positive rate, which is ideal for use in
access control where it is better to deny entry (prompt the user to confirm the
entry) than to allow an attacker entry. Higher thresholds increase
The classifier was tested on each predictor using 10-fold cross validation for
different values of threshold. Figure B.3 shows a typical command for running
the classifier on a dataset. The range of threshold values was from 0.5 to 2.2,
in increments of 0.1.
Figure 4.1: Testing the classifier with 10-fold cross validation for threshold=0.5
java weka.classifiers.rules.ClusterDistanceClassifier \
-t wifi-merged.arff -x 10 -C 0 -D 0.5
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4.1 Wireless Signals
Models were tested with different thresholds for short-range and long-range
data sets. The short-range data set was gathered at three locations in an
office building, close enough for some Bluetooth signals to be shared between
locations. The long-range data set was gathered approximately 10km across a
city, far enough for WiFi and Bluetooth signals to be completely different, and
for different cell towers to be used (even if the same cell towers are technically
in range).
Figure 4.2 shows the classification accuracy achieved with cross valida-
tion for each of the tested thresholds for the short-range data set, for each
gathered wireless signal type, plus one classifier that combines all the wireless
signal types together. The results show that WiFi provides the best prediction
accuracy for a single variable, followed by Cell and then Bluetooth. The com-
bination of all three wireless signals closely matches the performance of WiFi
alone, but does achieve a slightly higher prediction accuracy at high threshold
values, resulting in the best overall prediction accuracy. All wireless signals
achieved close to zero false-positive rate at low (0.5) threshold, increasing to
5% at high (2.2) threshold. The combination of all wireless signals achieved
zero false-positive rate at low (0.5) threshold, increasing to 1% at high (2.2)
threshold.
The long-range data set in figure 4.3 shows similar accuracy to the short-
range data set, with slightly improved overall performance, and reduced per-
formance for the Cell predictor at high threshold values. This is interesting,
as the Bluetooth and WiFi predictors should trivially have perfect classifica-
tion accuracy at such a long range based on the mere presence or lack of a
signal. When a signal is missing from an instance, it is given a value of -100,
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Figure 4.2: Wireless Signals over short range at different threshold values






















as if it was present with a very low RSSI. This is done to handle legitimate
readings where a signal is missing, which happens frequently when on the edge
of a signal’s viable range. From inspection of the input data sets, it appears
that indeed a significant proportion of the available signals are not present
in every valid reading, which results in the classifier learning that it is okay
for signals to be missing. As such, changing the default value to something
other than -100 does not result in improved classification accuracy, as a more
distinct “missing” value would also be used when training the model, thereby
biasing the model to still accept missing values for that signal. To handle
this properly, the classifier needs to reduce the impact of unreliable predictors
(predictors which accept missing values), without reducing the accuracy of the
reliable predictors (predictors which do not accept missing values).
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Figure 4.3: Wireless Signals over long range at different threshold values






















The input data set consisted of 1200 instances, which would represent a long
period of time for a single user’s access history events. In order to evaluate the
classifier on smaller datasets, subsets were generated using Figure 4.4 with 10%
and 1% of the instances, shown in figures 4.5 and 4.6. As expected there is a
decrease in classification accuracy for small data set sizes, however the classifier
does appear to behave consistently across data set sizes, and acceptably on
small data sets which will necessarily be encountered when initially building a
model.
Figure 4.4: Generate a random 10% subset of a dataset
java weka.filters.unsupervised.instance.Resample -S 1 -Z 10 \
-i wifi-merged.arff -o wifi-merged-10.arff
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Interestingly, Bluetooth consistently performs the worst of the wireless sig-
nals, despite having the shortest range (which should improve its accuracy
at predicting proximity to a location). There are multiple reasons for this:
ephemerality; and reliability. Because of Bluetooth’s use in portable devices,
signals are likely to appear or move unpredictably, meaning a signal may only
briefly be a useful predictor. Bluetooth’s short range also comes with the most
unreliable signal, which means signal strengths may differ significantly between
readings, even without moving the sender or receiver devices.
Figure 4.5: Classifier performance with reduced dataset (10% / 121 instances)






















The different wireless signals appear to perform best at different threshold
values. Bluetooth performs better at low thresholds, WiFi performs better at
higher thresholds but doesn’t change as much as Bluetooth, and Cell signals
perform approximately the same across a wide range of thresholds. This cor-
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relates with the properties of each signal: Bluetooth is a short-range signal
which fluctuates significantly in strength, meaning the standard deviation of
signal strength is already quite large. The threshold is the number of standard
deviations from the mean allowed, so increasing the threshold for Bluetooth
further increases the range of accepted values, including instances which should
be rejected. Missing signals are treated as zero signal strength, but at a high
threshold zero may be within the threshold range. WiFi is a medium-range
signal with more reliable signal strength, which means the standard deviation
is lower and there is a more distinct difference between accepted and rejected
instances. This results in less extreme response to the threshold, and enables
high threshold values to work better. Cell signals are a more extreme case
of the same principles applied to WiFi—a long-range signal with significantly
less fluctuation in signal strength (barring interference), results in low stand-
ard deviation. In this case the fluctuation in signal strength is low enough that
most values are classified correctly over a wide range of threshold values.
4.2 Other Sensors
Each of the sensors provided by the test device (listing A.1) were tested across
the range of threshold values. Most of the sensors were highly inaccurate, typ-
ically having accuracy of less than 50%. See tables A.5–A.7. Figure 4.7 shows
the accuracy of the most accurate sensors (choosing the best sensor where
multiple sensors represent the same base property), and some combinations.
Some sensors do appear to provide good classification accuracy. The most
significant of these are the Acceleration and Magnetic sensors. The magnetic
sensor could potentially be picking up a difference in magnetic field at the dif-
ferent locations due to nearby metal and electronics, however the accuracy of
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Figure 4.6: Classifier performance with reduced dataset (1% / 12 instances)























Figure 4.7: Sensors at different threshold values























Accel + Magnetic + Gyro
All Sensors
the acceleration sensor at distinguishing locations seems dubious. Most likely
it is distinguishing differences in user behaviour, or possibly a difference in the
angle of the floor at that location. Regardless, these sensors appear to provide a
classification accuracy significantly better than random guessing, and so could
be combined with other predictors to provide a more accurate combined pre-
diction. Combining the Acceleration and Magnetic sensors produces a slightly
better classifier that drops off far less at higher thresholds.
Unlike the wireless signals, these sensors appear to drop off significantly in
accuracy at higher threshold values. This makes sense, as the threshold is the
number of standard deviations from the average euclidean distance to accept—
how far from the typical reading before an instance is rejected. Increasing
the threshold increases the range of accepted values, which for environmental
43
sensors can be a small range to begin with. Increasing the threshold too far
can make it impossible to distinguish between valid and invalid authentica-
tion attempts. Conversely with wireless signals, increasing the threshold helps
filter out fluctuation/noise in the wireless signal strength. This difference in
requirement for threshold value means that when combining predictors, dif-
ferent threshold values may be necessary for different predictors in order to
maximise classification accuracy.
The combination of all the sensors approaches the accuracy of the best
single sensors for low threshold values, but quickly drops off to below 40% at
higher thresholds. This is due to the classification algorithm lacking an attrib-
ute selection mechanism. Attributes are normalised to a mean and standard
deviation, which evens out differences in the magnitude of different attributes.
However, if an attribute provides no useful information, it is still used with the
same priority as any other attribute. As the classifier classifies instances based
on their euclidean distance from the centre of the known “good” instances,
adding useless attributes reduces this distance, reducing the accuracy of the
classifier. To avoid this, attribute selection can be performed to only include
attributes which provide useful information. Attribute selection is problematic
with the constraints mentioned in section 3.1. A common method of attrib-
ute selection is the Wrapper method—score sets of attributes by training and
evaluating a model with that set of attributes. This method is not practical in
this situation, as it requires significant processing time, and needs examples of
unsuccessful access in order to score each model. Perhaps the application could
collect “unsuccessful access” data in the background when no access has been
attempted, however this will drain the battery and raises user privacy concerns.
One attribute selection behaviour that can be automatically performed is de-
tecting redundancy between multiple attributes. This can help avoid skewing
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the model with multiple redundant attributes, but does not solve the problem
with useless attributes. The best selection that can be achieved for useless at-
tributes is to remove attributes which appear to have random values. This still
may do more harm than good, as a “random” attribute at the access control
point could be in a different range than when away from the access control
point, or for wireless signals it could only exist at the access control point.
Both of these types of attributes could be useful in classification, but could
also be detrimental and are not easily distinguished in practice.
Interestingly, there is a significant difference in classification accuracy between
different sensors that read the same property—in some cases, between differ-
ent processed outputs from the same physical sensor. Figure 4.8 shows the
differences between four orientation sensors present on the test device, and
figure 4.9 shows the difference between the calibrated and uncalibrated mag-
netic field readings. The difference between processed outputs of a sensor is
likely due to smoothing resulting in a loss of information, which explains why
the uncalibrated magnetic sensor is slightly more accurate than the calibrated
form. However it also appears than in some cases the processed form of the
sensor is more accurate than the raw sensor—for example at a threshold of
1, the software-based orientation sensor [4] is more accurate than any other
orientation sensor.
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Figure 4.8: Orientation Sensors at different threshold values





















Figure 4.9: Magnetic Sensors at different threshold values
























There are a large collection of sensors available on a typical Android device.
Listing A.1 shows the full list from the test device. Many of these sensors rep-
resent the same underlying property, or are not useful as predictors of proximity
to an access control device. Due to technical limitations that prevent accurate
attribute selection on the mobile device, these predictors should be selected
ahead of time using offline analysis of sample data. Different devices may have
different sensors available, however standard sensors are always exposed under
the same sensor identifier [4] if they are available, which makes it possible to
use a pre-defined list of sensors. Based on analysis of collected data, the ac-
celeration and magnetic field sensors appear to be the most useful sensors for
use as predictors.
Combine Predictors
Evaluation of the classifier on sensor and wireless signal data available on the
test device found that wireless signal strength and some sensors (acceleration
and magnetic field) proved to be strong indicators of proximity to the access
control device. Combining these together with a typical timing-based distance
bounding algorithm could be used to achieve highly accurate relay attack de-
tection, and resilience to an attacker attempting to specifically subvert the
predictors. For example, an attacker could spoof wireless signals, but with




Different predictors perform better at different threshold values. This is eas-
ily demonstrated by comparing the wireless signal predictors (which when
combined perform best at a threshold of approximately 2.0), with the sensor
predictors (which when combined perform best at a threshold of approxim-
ately 0.6). When combining these predictors, they may need to use different
thresholds to achieve maximum classification performance. The wireless pre-
dictors individually perform better at lower thresholds (0.8 for Bluetooth; 1.6
for Cell; and 1.8 for WiFi), so the combined wireless predictor may benefit
further from using their best individual thresholds when combining. The al-
gorithm could be modified to normalise attributes according to their threshold
in order to handle different thresholds for each attribute, or multiple individual
classifiers could be used and combined to produce a single final prediction.
It is also necessary to take into account the false-positive rate when choosing
a threshold value. Lower thresholds result in lower false-positive rates, at the
cost of potentially lower accuracy.
Avoid Long-Range Silent Authentication
The purpose of this project was to detect relay attacks against a wireless
communications protocol (Bluetooth) with properties that make conventional
distance bounding unreliable or impossible. This problem can be minimised by
not performing silent (non-interactive) authentication over Bluetooth. Instead
a wireless protocol with less range and more reliable timing (such as NFC)
should be used, to minimise the possibility of a relay attack, and maximise
the effectiveness of distance bounding. Authentication can still be performed
over Bluetooth for use cases where it makes sense (longer distance), however
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requiring the user to interact with their device (respond to a prompt) minimises
the risk of a relay attack being successful.
Conclusion
When used individually, the predictors investigated in this project do not
provide acceptable accuracy in detecting relay attacks. When combined how-
ever, they can achieve a very high classification accuracy with resilience against
an attacker attempting to break individual predictors. Security can also be im-




Traditional timing-based distance bounding is not reliable on mobile Bluetooth
connections, due to significant delays which cannot be measured by the mobile
application. This thesis investigated alternative methods for using sensors and
observable signals to fingerprint a location, thereby detecting and preventing
relay attacks when the application is used in an unexpected location.
The prototype created in this research used a custom classification al-
gorithm designed to work with the specific requirements of the input data and
the target mobile devices. Using this classification algorithm, the prototype
was able to detect relay attacks at an accuracy of over 95% for several radio
signals, and over 70% for several other sensor types, with the best performing
single predictor being observed WiFi signals. This performance is comparable
to the accuracy of timing-based distance bounding in internal tests at Galla-
gher, which varied significantly between devices. Combining multiple sensors
was able to improve accuracy compared to using a single sensor, as well as
theoretically providing resilience against an attacker spoofing the sensors.
6.1 Future Work
The scope of this research focused on investigating an alternative to traditional
timing-based distance bounding for a wireless communications protocol where
timing is unreliable. The basis of this came from the fact that attacks have been
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demonstrated to be possible against weak timing-based distance bounding. If
considering using any of the predictors investigated in this research, it would
be worthwhile to investigate how an adversary would attack these predictors,
and assessing the risk relative to a timing-based approach.
In theory combining multiple predictors makes it harder for an attacker to
trick the system by fooling the predictors. An interesting area of research would
be to quantify the accuracy which can be achieved by a classifier that combines
multiple predictors, and how resilient such a system really is in practice, if one
or more predictors are fooled and produce incorrect classifications.
This research identified the requirements for classification in an access con-
trol situation (i.e. time constraints, incremental update), and identified some
predictors which should work under those requirements. Future work could
look into the performance of predictors under those requirements in order to
judge the practicality of implementing such a system in reality. In particular,
some predictors may only be able to produce cached values within the time
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Appendix A Data Listings
Listing A.1: Full list of supported sensors
1 android . s enso r . a c c e l e romete r
2 android . s enso r . game_rotation_vector
3 android . s enso r . geomagnet ic_rotat ion_vector
4 android . s enso r . g r av i ty
5 android . s enso r . gyroscope
6 android . s enso r . gyroscope_unca l ibrated
7 android . s enso r . l i g h t
8 android . s enso r . l i n e a r_a c c e l e r a t i o n
9 android . s enso r . magnet i c_f i e ld
10 android . s enso r . magnet i c_f i e ld_unca l ibrated
11 android . s enso r . o r i e n t a t i o n
12 android . s enso r . proximity
13 android . s enso r . ro tat ion_vector
14 android . s enso r . step_counter
15 com . q t i . s en so r . amd
16 com . q t i . s en so r . motion_accel
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Table A.1: Evaluation of clustering classifier accuracy on wireless signals over
short range (all instances)
threshold Bluetooth WiFi Cell Combined
0.5 87.438 85.7025 83.719 86.8595
0.6 87.7686 87.2727 87.6033 88.0992
0.7 88.0992 88.4298 87.2727 88.843
0.8 88.2645 90 92.3967 90
0.9 87.6033 91.7355 93.8017 90.7438
1.0 86.9421 92.6446 93.8017 91.9835
1.1 86.8595 93.3884 93.8017 92.9752
1.2 86.0331 94.2975 93.8843 94.0496
1.3 85.4545 94.9587 93.8843 95.124
1.4 83.5537 95.7851 93.8843 95.7025
1.5 83.1405 96.1157 93.9669 96.0331
1.6 81.8182 96.9421 93.9669 96.4463
1.7 77.6033 97.1074 92.562 97.1074
1.8 77.5207 97.2727 91.9835 97.6033
1.9 77.438 97.1901 92.0661 97.8512
2.0 77.5207 96.281 92.0661 98.0992
2.1 77.6033 96.281 91.9008 98.0165
2.2 77.2727 95.8678 89.0083 97.9339
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Table A.2: Evaluation of clustering classifier accuracy on wireless signals over
short range (10% / 121 instances)
threshold Bluetooth WiFi Cell Combined
0.5 86.7769 96.6942 82.6446 95.8678
0.6 86.7769 96.6942 82.6446 95.0413
0.7 86.7769 97.5207 83.4711 96.6942
0.8 87.6033 97.5207 88.4298 96.6942
0.9 86.7769 97.5207 95.0413 97.5207
1.0 86.7769 98.3471 95.8678 97.5207
1.1 86.7769 98.3471 95.0413 97.5207
1.2 85.124 98.3471 95.0413 97.5207
1.3 84.2975 98.3471 94.2149 97.5207
1.4 83.4711 98.3471 94.2149 97.5207
1.5 83.4711 98.3471 94.2149 98.3471
1.6 82.6446 98.3471 94.2149 98.3471
1.7 82.6446 98.3471 93.3884 98.3471
1.8 82.6446 98.3471 93.3884 98.3471
1.9 82.6446 98.3471 93.3884 98.3471
2.0 83.4711 98.3471 93.3884 98.3471
2.1 83.4711 96.6942 93.3884 98.3471
2.2 83.4711 96.6942 93.3884 98.3471
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Table A.3: Evaluation of clustering classifier accuracy on wireless signals over
short range (1% / 12 instances)
threshold Bluetooth WiFi Cell Combined
0.5 75 75 66.6667 83.3333
0.6 75 75 66.6667 83.3333
0.7 75 75 75 83.3333
0.8 75 75 75 83.3333
0.9 75 75 75 83.3333
1.0 75 75 75 91.6667
1.1 75 75 100 91.6667
1.2 75 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.3 75 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.4 75 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.5 83.3333 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.6 75 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.7 75 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.8 75 83.3333 100 91.6667
1.9 75 91.6667 100 91.6667
2.0 75 91.6667 100 91.6667
2.1 66.6667 91.6667 100 91.6667
2.2 66.6667 91.6667 100 91.6667
62
Table A.4: Evaluation of clustering classifier accuracy on wireless signals over
long range
threshold Bluetooth WiFi Cell Combined
0.5 79.3627 81.6388 75.1138 82.2458
0.6 80.4249 83.915 85.2807 84.0668
0.7 82.2458 85.8877 88.0121 85.8877
0.8 84.3703 88.3156 88.0121 88.0121
0.9 84.9772 89.0744 88.9226 90.2883
1.0 86.0395 91.654 91.5023 91.3505
1.1 86.9499 93.3232 91.654 92.5645
1.2 87.2534 94.0819 91.654 93.6267
1.3 87.5569 94.3854 90.5918 94.2337
1.4 67.0713 94.6889 89.8331 94.5372
1.5 67.0713 94.9924 89.6813 95.2959
1.6 67.0713 95.7511 89.0744 96.2064
1.7 67.0713 96.0546 87.5569 96.3581
1.8 67.0713 96.8134 84.9772 96.9651
1.9 67.2231 96.8134 78.1487 97.4203
2.0 67.0713 97.2686 72.9894 97.7238
2.1 67.0713 97.8756 72.0789 97.7238
2.2 67.0713 98.3308 72.0789 98.0273
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0.5 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
0.6 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
0.7 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
0.8 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
0.9 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.0 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.1 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.2 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.3 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.4 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.5 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.6 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.7 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.8 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
1.9 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
2.0 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
2.1 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
2.2 65.5589 35.9517 67.0695
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0.5 54.0785 59.5166 32.0242 30.8157 73.1118 73.4139 42.2961 48.9426
0.6 50.4532 58.006 31.4199 31.4199 70.3927 72.2054 42.5982 47.432
0.7 48.0363 58.006 32.3263 32.3263 68.8822 68.5801 43.2024 43.2024
0.8 47.432 55.8912 32.0242 33.2326 67.9758 68.2779 43.2024 43.2024
0.9 45.9215 50.7553 32.9305 33.2326 67.3716 67.3716 44.713 41.6918
1.0 44.713 42.2961 32.6284 32.3263 67.0695 67.0695 46.8278 37.7644
1.1 44.713 36.858 32.9305 32.6284 66.4653 66.4653 47.7341 34.7432
1.2 45.9215 37.7644 32.3263 32.3263 66.7674 66.7674 41.0876 34.4411
1.3 46.8278 36.2538 33.2326 33.2326 67.3716 67.3716 36.2538 33.5347
1.4 48.3384 34.4411 33.8369 33.8369 67.6737 67.6737 35.6495 33.8369
1.5 38.0665 32.0242 33.8369 33.8369 67.0695 67.6737 34.4411 34.4411
1.6 35.3474 31.7221 33.8369 33.8369 65.2568 66.1631 34.4411 34.7432
1.7 34.4411 32.0242 33.8369 33.8369 64.3505 64.6526 34.4411 34.7432
1.8 34.4411 32.6284 33.8369 33.8369 62.8399 62.8399 34.4411 34.7432
1.9 34.4411 32.9305 33.8369 33.8369 52.8701 54.6828 34.4411 34.4411
2.0 34.4411 32.9305 33.8369 33.8369 44.4109 45.0151 34.4411 34.4411
2.1 34.4411 32.9305 33.8369 33.8369 32.9305 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411
2.2 34.4411 32.9305 33.8369 33.8369 32.9305 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411
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0.5 66.1631 65.2568 38.6707 51.6616 65.861
0.6 65.2568 65.861 38.6707 51.6616 64.9547
0.7 65.5589 57.4018 36.858 51.6616 65.2568
0.8 64.9547 50.4532 36.2538 51.6616 62.5378
0.9 61.6314 51.3595 35.6495 51.6616 52.2659
1.0 50.7553 50.7553 35.6495 51.6616 49.8489
1.1 52.568 50.1511 33.8369 51.6616 51.3595
1.2 52.2659 47.1299 35.0453 51.6616 50.1511
1.3 51.0574 36.858 35.0453 51.6616 49.5468
1.4 49.8489 35.6495 35.0453 51.6616 47.7341
1.5 48.6405 34.4411 34.139 43.2024 39.2749
1.6 39.8792 34.4411 35.0453 36.2538 33.2326
1.7 33.2326 34.4411 34.7432 36.2538 32.9305
1.8 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411 32.9305 32.9305
1.9 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411 32.9305 32.9305
2.0 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411 32.9305 32.9305
2.1 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411 32.9305 32.9305
2.2 32.9305 34.4411 34.4411 32.9305 32.9305
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0.5 66.4653 73.1118 47.7341
0.6 63.7462 74.6224 44.1088
0.7 59.8187 74.0181 36.858
0.8 51.3595 72.5076 36.2538
0.9 47.432 71.9033 35.9517
1.0 40.7855 71.9033 36.858
1.1 39.577 70.997 36.2538
1.2 38.3686 69.7885 35.3474
1.3 37.4622 67.9758 34.7432
1.4 37.4622 66.1631 35.3474
1.5 36.858 64.9547 35.0453
1.6 36.5559 64.0483 34.4411
1.7 36.5559 63.4441 34.7432
1.8 36.2538 62.8399 34.139
1.9 35.0453 63.142 34.139
2.0 35.3474 61.6314 34.4411
2.1 35.3474 52.568 35.0453
2.2 35.3474 49.2447 34.7432
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Appendix B Code Listings
Listing B.1: Processing RSSI input CSVs into ARFF dataset
1 #!/ usr / b in /env ruby
2
3 CLASSES = %w(
4 Ce l lDataCo l l e c to r
5 Wi f iDataCol l ec tor




10 attr_reader : source
11 at t r_acce s so r : va lue
12 def i n i t i a l i z e ( source , va lue )
13 @source = source





19 attr_reader : read ings , : c l a s s_va lue
20 def i n i t i a l i z e ( c la s s_va lue )
68
21 @class_value = c las s_va lue




26 a t t r s = {}
27 samples = [ ]
28
29 ARGV. each do | class_name |
30 Dir . e n t r i e s ( class_name ) . each do | f i le_name |
31 f i l e_path = "#{class_name}/#{fi le_name}"
32 next unless F i l e . f i l e ? f i l e_path
33 sample = Sample . new( class_name )
34 F i l e . f o r each ( f i l e_path ) do | l i n e |
35 c o l s = l i n e . s p l i t ’ , ’
36 next unless CLASSES. in c lude ? c o l s [ 0 ]
37 read ing = Reading . new( c o l s [ 2 ] , c o l s [ −1 ] . to_i )
38 a t t r s [ r ead ing . source ] = 1
39 ex i s t ing_read ing = sample . r ead ings [ read ing . source ]
40 i f ex i s t ing_read ing . ni l ?
41 sample . r ead ings [ read ing . source ] = read ing
42 else
43 ex i s t ing_read ing . va lue = ( ex i s t ing_read ing . va lue
↪→ + read ing . va lue ) / 2
44 end
45 end





50 puts "@re la t i on ␣ ’ radio−s i g n a l s ’ "
51
52 ordered_attrs = a t t r s . keys
53 ordered_attrs . each do | key |
54 puts "@attr ibute ␣ ’#{key } ’ ␣numeric "
55 end
56
57 class_names = ARGV.map { | c | " ’#{c } ’ " }
58 puts "@attr ibute ␣ c l a s s ␣{#{class_names . j o i n ␣ ’ , ␣ ’}} "
59
60 puts "@data"
61 samples . each do | sample |
62 va lue s = ordered_attrs .map { | a t t r | sample . r ead ings [
↪→ a t t r ]&. va lue or ’ ? ’ }
63 puts "#{va lue s . j o i n ␣ ’ , ’} ,#{ sample . c la s s_va lue }"
64 end
Listing B.2: Processing sensor input CSVs into ARFF dataset
1 #!/ usr / b in /env ruby
2
3 CLASSES = %w(
4 android . s enso r . a c ce l e romete r
5 android . s enso r . magnet i c_f i e ld_unca l ibrated





10 attr_reader : source
11 at t r_acce s so r : va lue
12 def i n i t i a l i z e ( source , va lue )
13 @source = source





19 attr_reader : read ings , : c l a s s_va lue
20 def i n i t i a l i z e ( c la s s_va lue )
21 @class_value = c las s_va lue




26 a t t r s = {}
27 samples = [ ]
28
29 ARGV. each do | class_name |
30 Dir . e n t r i e s ( class_name ) . each do | f i le_name |
31 f i l e_path = "#{class_name}/#{fi le_name}"
32 next unless F i l e . f i l e ? f i l e_path
33 sample = Sample . new( class_name )
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34 F i l e . f o r each ( f i l e_path ) do | l i n e |
35 c o l s = l i n e . s p l i t ’ , ’
36 next unless CLASSES. in c lude ? c o l s [ 0 ]
37 c o l s [ 2 . . − 1 ] . each_with_index do | value , index |
38 name = "#{c o l s [0]}−#{( ’A ’ . ord␣+␣ index ) . chr }"
39 read ing = Reading . new(name , va lue . to_f )
40 a t t r s [ r ead ing . source ] = 1
41 ex i s t ing_read ing = sample . r ead ings [ read ing .
↪→ source ]
42 i f ex i s t ing_read ing . ni l ?
43 sample . r ead ings [ read ing . source ] = read ing
44 else
45 ex i s t ing_read ing . va lue = ( ex i s t ing_read ing .








53 puts "@re la t i on ␣ ’ radio−s i g n a l s ’ "
54
55 ordered_attrs = a t t r s . keys
56 ordered_attrs . each do | key |




60 class_names = ARGV.map { | c | " ’#{c } ’ " }
61 puts "@attr ibute ␣ c l a s s ␣{#{class_names . j o i n ␣ ’ , ␣ ’}} "
62
63 puts "@data"
64 samples . each do | sample |
65 va lue s = ordered_attrs .map { | a t t r | sample . r ead ings [
↪→ a t t r ]&. va lue or ’ ? ’ }
66 puts "#{va lue s . j o i n ␣ ’ , ’} ,#{ sample . c la s s_va lue }"
67 end
Listing B.3: Running the classifier for the WiFi dataset
1 #!/ usr / b in /env sh
2
3 for i in 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8 0 .9 1 .0 1 .1 1 .2 1 .3 1 .4 1 .5 1 .6
↪→ 1 .7 1 .8 1 .9 2 .0 2 .1 2 .2
4 do
5 java weka . c l a s s i f i e r s . r u l e s .
↪→ C lu s t e rD i s t a n c eC l a s s i f i e r −t w i f i−merged . a r f f
↪→ −x 10 −C 0 −D $ i | grep ’ Cor r e c t l y C l a s s i f i e d ’
↪→ | t a i l −1 | grep −o ’ [^ ]\+ \+%’
6 done 2>/dev/ nu l l
Listing B.4: Bluetooth Data Collector
1 public class BluetoothDataCol l ector extends
↪→ DataCol l ec tor {




5 public void c o l l e c t ( Context context ) {
6 mBluetoothScanner = new BluetoothScanner (new
↪→ ScanCallback ( ) {
7 @Override
8 public void onScanResult ( int cal lbackType ,
↪→ ScanResult r e s u l t ) {
9 output ( timeFromNanos ( r e s u l t . getTimestampNanos ( ) )
↪→ ,
10 r e s u l t . getDevice ( ) . getAddress ( ) ,
11 r e s u l t . getDevice ( ) . getName ( ) ,
12 r e s u l t . g e tRs s i ( ) ) ;
13 }
14 }) ;




19 public void stop ( Context context ) {
20 mBluetoothScanner . stopScan ( ) ;
21 }
22 }
Listing B.5: Cell Data Collector
1 public class Ce l lDataCo l l e c to r extends DataCol l ec tor {
2 @Override
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3 public void c o l l e c t ( Context context ) {
4 TelephonyManager telephonyManager = (
↪→ TelephonyManager ) context . getSystemServ ice (
↪→ Context .TELEPHONY_SERVICE) ;
5 for ( C e l l I n f o i n f o : telephonyManager . g e tA l lC e l l I n f o
↪→ ( ) ) {
6 Date date = timeFromNanos ( i n f o . getTimeStamp ( ) ) ;
7 i f ( i n f o instanceof CellInfoCdma ) {
8 CellInfoCdma infoCdma = ( CellInfoCdma ) i n f o ;
9 output (
10 date ,
11 infoCdma . g e tCe l l I d e n t i t y ( ) . g e tBase s ta t i on Id
↪→ ( ) ,
12 "CDMA" ,
13 infoCdma . g e tCe l l S i gna lS t r eng th ( ) . getDbm()
14 ) ;
15 } else i f ( i n f o instanceof CellInfoGsm ) {
16 CellInfoGsm infoGsm = ( CellInfoGsm ) i n f o ;
17 output (
18 date ,
19 infoGsm . g e tCe l l I d e n t i t y ( ) . getCid ( ) ,
20 "GSM" ,
21 infoGsm . g e tCe l l S i gna lS t r eng th ( ) . getDbm( )
22 ) ;
23 } else i f ( i n f o instanceof Ce l l I n f oL t e ) {




27 in f oLt e . g e tC e l l I d e n t i t y ( ) . getCi ( ) ,
28 "LTE" ,
29 in f oLt e . g e tCe l l S i gna lS t r eng th ( ) . getDbm( )
30 ) ;
31 } else i f ( i n f o instanceof CellInfoWcdma ) {
32 CellInfoWcdma infoWcdma = (CellInfoWcdma ) i n f o ;
33 output (
34 date ,
35 infoWcdma . g e tC e l l I d e n t i t y ( ) . getCid ( ) ,
36 "WCDMA" ,






Listing B.6: WiFi Data Collector
1 public class Wif iDataCol l ec tor extends DataCol l ec tor {
2 private WifiScanner mWifiScanner ;
3 private boolean gotNewData = fa l se ;
4
5 private void logData ( ) {
6 for ( ScanResult r e s u l t : mWifiScanner . getScanResu l t s
↪→ ( ) ) {
7 output ( timeFromNanos ( r e s u l t . timestamp ∗ 1_000) ,
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12 public void c o l l e c t ( Context context ) {
13 mWifiScanner = new WifiScanner ( context , new
↪→ BroadcastRece iver ( ) {
14 @Override
15 public void onReceive ( Context context , In tent
↪→ i n t en t ) {
16 gotNewData = true ;
17 logData ( ) ;
18 }
19 }) ;




24 public void stop ( Context context ) {
25 mWifiScanner . stopScan ( context ) ;
26 i f ( ! gotNewData ) {





Listing B.7: Sensors Data Collector
1 public class Sen so rCo l l e c t o r extends DataCol l ec tor {
2 private class Senso rCo l l e c to rHe lpe r extends
↪→ Tr iggerEventL i s t ener implements
↪→ SensorEventLi s tener {
3 private f ina l St r ing mName;
4 private f ina l Sensor mSensor ;
5
6 Senso rCo l l e c to rHe lpe r ( Sensor sensor , SensorManager
↪→ sensorManager ) {
7 mName = senso r . getStr ingType ( ) ;
8 mSensor = senso r ;
9 i f ( s enso r . getReportingMode ( ) == Sensor .
↪→ REPORTING_MODE_ONE_SHOT) {
10 sensorManager . r eque s tTr i gge rSenso r ( this , s en so r )
↪→ ;
11 } else {
12 sensorManager . r e g i s t e r L i s t e n e r ( this , sensor ,





17 public void onSensorChanged ( SensorEvent event ) {
18 outputFloats (mName, timeFromNanos ( event . timestamp )





22 public void onAccuracyChanged ( Sensor sensor , int




26 public void onTrigger ( TriggerEvent event ) {
27 outputFloats (mName, timeFromNanos ( event . timestamp )
↪→ , event . va lue s ) ;
28 }
29
30 void stop ( SensorManager sensorManager ) {
31 i f (mSensor . getReportingMode ( ) == Sensor .
↪→ REPORTING_MODE_ONE_SHOT) {
32 sensorManager . cance lTr i gge rSenso r ( this , mSensor )
↪→ ;
33 } else {





39 private SensorManager mSensorManager ;
40 private f ina l List<SensorCo l l e c to rHe lpe r> mSensors =




43 public void c o l l e c t ( Context context ) {
44 mSensorManager = ( SensorManager ) context .
↪→ getSystemServ ice ( Context .SENSOR_SERVICE) ;
45 for ( Sensor s enso r : mSensorManager . g e tSen so rL i s t (
↪→ Sensor .TYPE_ALL) ) {
46 mSensors . add (new Senso rCo l l e c to rHe lpe r ( sensor ,





51 public void stop ( Context context ) {
52 for ( Senso rCo l l e c to rHe lpe r s enso r : mSensors ) {




Listing B.8: Weka Classifier Implementation
1 public class C lu s t e rD i s t a n c eC l a s s i f i e r extends
↪→ Ab s t r a c tC l a s s i f i e r implements
↪→ WeightedInstancesHandler , OptionHandler {
2 class Dimension implements S e r i a l i z a b l e {




6 class Locat ion implements S e r i a l i z a b l e {
7 public f ina l Map<Attr ibute , Dimension> dimensions =
↪→ new HashMap<Attr ibute , Dimension >() ;
8 }
9
10 private int m_ClassIndex = 0 ;
11 private double m_DistFactor = 2 . 0 ; // s e t in op t i ons
12 private Locat ion m_Cluster ;
13 private double m_DistCutoff ;
14
15 @Override
16 public void b u i l dC l a s s i f i e r ( In s tance s i n s t an c e s )
↪→ throws Exception {
17 g e tCapab i l i t i e s ( ) . t e s tWithFa i l ( i n s t an c e s ) ;
18
19 Att r ibute c l a s sA t t r = in s t an c e s . c l a s sA t t r i bu t e ( ) ;
20 m_Cluster = new Locat ion ( ) ;
21
22 Enumeration<Attr ibute> a t t r s = in s t an c e s .
↪→ enumerateAttr ibutes ( ) ;
23 while ( a t t r s . hasMoreElements ( ) ) {
24 Att r ibute a t t r = a t t r s . nextElement ( ) ;
25 Dimension dim = new Dimension ( ) ;
26 double t o t a l = 0 ;
27 for ( Ins tance in s t ance : i n s t an c e s ) {
28 i f ( i n s t ance . va lue ( c l a s sA t t r ) != m_ClassIndex | |
↪→ i n s t ance . i sM i s s i ng ( a t t r ) ) {
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29 continue ;
30 } else {
31 t o t a l += in s tance . va lue ( a t t r ) ;
32 dim . count += 1 ;
33 }
34 }
35 dim .mean = t o t a l / dim . count ;
36 dim . var iance = 0 ;
37 for ( Ins tance in s t ance : i n s t an c e s ) {
38 i f ( i n s t ance . va lue ( c l a s sA t t r ) != m_ClassIndex | |
↪→ i n s t ance . i sM i s s i ng ( a t t r ) ) {
39 continue ;
40 } else {
41 double xMinusMean = in s tance . va lue ( a t t r ) − dim
↪→ . mean ;
42 dim . var iance += (xMinusMean ∗ xMinusMean) ;
43 }
44 }
45 i f (dim . count > 1) {
46 dim . var i ance /= (dim . count − 1) ;




51 double t o t a lD i s t = 0 ;
52 double count = 0 ;
53 for ( Ins tance in s t ance : i n s t an c e s ) {
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54 i f ( i n s t ance . va lue ( c l a s sA t t r ) == m_ClassIndex ) {
55 t o t a lD i s t += d i s t ( i n s t anc e ) ;
56 count += 1 ;
57 }
58 }
59 double meanDist = t o t a lD i s t / count ;
60 double var i anceD i s t = 0 ;
61 for ( Ins tance in s t ance : i n s t an c e s ) {
62 i f ( i n s t ance . va lue ( c l a s sA t t r ) == m_ClassIndex ) {
63 double xMinusMean = d i s t ( i n s t anc e ) − meanDist ;
64 var i anceD i s t += (xMinusMean ∗ xMinusMean) ;
65 }
66 }
67 double stdDevDist = Math . s q r t ( va r i anceD i s t / ( count
↪→ − 1) ) ;
68 m_DistCutoff = meanDist + stdDevDist ∗ m_DistFactor ;
69 }
70
71 double e r r (double x , double mean , double stdDev ) {
72 double z = Math . abs ( ( x − mean) / stdDev ) ;
73 double t = 1 .0 / ( 1 . 0 + 0 .5 ∗ Math . abs ( z ) ) ;
74 // approximate e r f
75 double e r f = 1 − t ∗ Math . exp(−z∗z − 1.26551223 +
76 t ∗ ( 1 .00002368 +
77 t ∗ ( 0 .37409196 +
78 t ∗ ( 0 .09678418 +
79 t ∗ (−0.18628806 +
83
80 t ∗ ( 0 .27886807 +
81 t ∗ (−1.13520398 +
82 t ∗ ( 1 .48851587 +
83 t ∗ (−0.82215223 +
84 t ∗ ( 0 .17087277) ) ) ) )
↪→ ) ) ) ) ) ;
85 i f ( z >= 0) return e r f ;
86 else return −e r f ;
87 }
88
89 double d i s t ( Ins tance in s t ance ) {
90 double d i s t = 0 ;
91 Enumeration<Attr ibute> a t t r s = in s t ance .
↪→ enumerateAttr ibutes ( ) ;
92 while ( a t t r s . hasMoreElements ( ) ) {
93 Att r ibute a t t r = a t t r s . nextElement ( ) ;
94 Dimension dim = m_Cluster . d imensions . get ( a t t r ) ;
95 double value ;
96 i f ( i n s t ance . i sM i s s i ng ( a t t r ) ) {
97 value = −100;
98 } else {
99 value = in s tance . va lue ( a t t r ) ;
100 }
101 double de l t a = 0 ;
102 i f (dim == null ) {
103 de l t a = Math . s q r t (100 . 0 + value ) ;
104 } else {
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105 double a t t rEr r = e r r ( value , dim .mean , Math . s q r t (
↪→ dim . var i ance ) ) ;
106 double a t t rD i s t = at t rEr r ∗ Math . l og (dim . count ) ;
107 de l t a = Math . s q r t ( a t t rD i s t ) ;
108 }
109 i f ( ! Double . isNaN ( de l t a ) ) {
110 d i s t += de l t a ;
111 }
112 }




117 public double c l a s s i f y I n s t a n c e ( Ins tance in s t anc e ) {
118 i f ( d i s t ( i n s t anc e ) < m_DistCutoff ) {
119 return m_ClassIndex ;
120 } else {




125 // Option pars ing and metadata omit ted f o r b r e v i t y
126 }
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